Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2009

Grindstaff v. Grindstaff : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Guy L. Black; Greenwood & Black.
James G. Clark; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Grindstaff v. Grindstaff, No. 20090505 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1737

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

\ f V-^ •

w

%*-- \

ftuc,.?x>,2roic>
IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS

OLGA LUCIA GRINDSTAFF,
Appellant,
v.

Appeal No. 20090505

ROBERT LEE GRINDSTAFF,
Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

THIS IS A DIRECT APPEAL FROM A FEEDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND FINAL ORDER ENTERED IN THE
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE
HONORABLE JAMES R. TAYLOR, PRESIDING.
0O0

JAMES G. CLARK, Utah State Bar #3637
Attorney for Appellant
43 E. 200 N.
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801)375-1717
Facsimile: (801)375-1172
Guy L. Black
GREENWOOD & BLACK
1840 North State Street, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604

ORAL ARGUMENT/PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

JUL 2 7 2010

IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS
OLGA LUCIA GRINDSTAFF,
Appellant,
v.

Appeal No. 20090505

ROBERT LEE GRINDSTAFF,
Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

THIS IS A DIRECT APPEAL FROM A FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND FINAL ORDER ENTERED IN THE
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE
HONORABLE JAMES R. TAYLOR, PRESIDING.
0O0

JAMES G. CLARK, Utah State Bar #3637
Attorney for Appellant
43E.200N.
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801)375-1717
Facsimile: (801)375-1172
Guy L. Black
GREENWOOD & BLACK
1840 North State Street, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604

ORAL ARGUMENT/PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1
STATEMENT OF FACTS
2
ARGUMENT
4
I.
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPROPRIATELY APPLY AND
WEIGH THE CUSTODY FACTORS
4
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS EXCLUSION
OF APPELLANT'S EXPERT WITNESS
9
A.
Dr. Hopper was prepared to Rebut Dr. Jensen's findings in the
Custody Evaluation Report
9
B.
The Trial Court's Exclusion of Dr. Hopper's Testimony Prejudiced
the Outcome of the Trial
11
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO SUFFICIENTLY SET
FORTH ITS FINDINGS CONCERNING ITS AGREEMENT WITH
AND DEVIATION FROM DR. JENSEN'S REPORT
13
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IMPOSING RESTRICTIVE PARENT
TIME AND REJECTING DR. JENSEN'S VISITATION
RECOMMENDATION
16
V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS
FOR ROBERT'S CONTEMPT OF COURT
18
VI. APPELLANT HAS PROPERLY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE 20
VII. THE ISSUE OF CHILD SUPPORT IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS
COURT
21
VIII. APPELLEE FAILED TO ADEQUATELY PRESERVE HIS ISSUES
THROUGH CROSS-APPEAL IN THIS MATTER
22
IX. THE APPEAL IS NO RENDERED MOOT BY THE TEMPORARY
ORDERS ISSUED IN THE MOTHER'S PETITION TO MODIFY.
23
CONCLUSION
25
Attachments
Exhibit "A" Transcripts from Two Day Bench Trial, dated June 3, 2008
Exhibit " B " Objection to Respondent's Proposed Order, dated March 19, 2009
Exhibit "C" Amended Order on Motion for Temporary Orders, dated April 14, 2010

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Caselaw
Anderson v. Thompson 2008 UT App 3,176 P3d 464
Davis v. Davis. 749 P.2d 647 (Utah 1988)
Erwin V. Erwin. 773 P2d 847.108 Utah Adv Rep 55.1989 Utah App LEXIS 731
Glacier Land Co.. L.L.C. v. Claudia Klawe & Associates. L.L.C. 2006 UT App. 516,
154 P.3d 852
Hansen v. Hansen. 2009 UT App. 365.223 P.3d 456
Hutchison v. Hutchison. 649 P.2d 38(Utah 1982)
Jorgensenv.Jorgensen. Utah, 599 P.2d 510 (1979)
KUTV v. Conder. 668 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1983)
Larsen v. Larsen. 888 P.2d 719 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
Merriam v. Merriam. 799 P.2d 1172 (Utah App.,1990)
Puseyv.Pusey. 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986)
State v. Lindgren. 910 P.2d 1268(Utah Ct.App.1996)
Sukin v. Sukin. 842 P.2d 922(Utah Ct. App. 1992)
Trubetzkoy v. Trubetzkoy. 2009 UT App. 77,205 P.3d 891
Udy v. Udy 893 P.2d 1097(Utah App.,1995)

Page
19, 20
5
5
11
8,24
4
4
24
6, 7, 24
13
4
11
9
16,18
16

Wickham v. Fisher. 629 P.2d 896 (Utah 1981)

24

Winters v. Schulman. 1999 UT App. 119, 977 P.2d 1218

23

Rules, Statutes and Constitutions:
Rule 493
UT. R. APP. P. 4(d)
UT. R. APP. P. 24(a)(9)
UT. R. EviD. 702
UT. R. EviD. 702(a)
UT. R. EviD. 702(b)
UTAH C O D E A N N . §30-3-3(1)
UTAH C O D E A N N . §30-3-3(2)
UTAH C O D E A N N . §30-3-10.1(1)
UTAH C O D E A N N . §30-3-10.1(2)
UTAH C O D E A N N . §30-3-35
UTAH C O D E A N N . §30-3-35(2)
UTAH C O D E A N N . § 30-3-37(5)
U T A H C O D E A N N . §78B-12-205
UTAH C O D E A N N . §78b-12-302
UTAH C O D E OF JUD. ADMIN. R. 4-903
UTAH C O D E OF JUD.ADMIN.R. 4-903(4)
UTAH C O D E OF JUD.ADMIN.R. 4-903(5)
UTAH C O D E OF JUD. ADMIN. R. 4-903(7)

10
23
20
11
10
10
18,19
18,19,20
13,15
13
16,24
16
16,18
21
21, 22
13
14,16
14,16
9

Other:
Advisory Committee Note. %>

10

ii

I N T H E UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS

OLGA LUCIA GRINDSTAFF,
Appellant,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

]

v.
ROBERT LEE GRINDSTAFF,
Appellee.

;)

]
)
;

Appeal No. 20090505

]

STATEMENT OF T H E CASE
This is a custody case between two good parents where the trial Judge adopted the
legal conclusion of the custody evaluator and both applied the wrong standard. Everyone
involved in this case, from the Domestic Relations Commissioner, GAL, Custody Evaluator,
to the District Court Judge found this case to involve two good parents, and a "very close
call." The custody evaluator and the Judge found the "most important factor" to be
maintaining the children in their community. The divorce was granted without fault.
The defendant's statement of the case and statement of the facts is, at best, an
attempt at creative writing. In so many ways, Olga fits a stereotype: a thick tongued Latina
who married a gringo to get her green card and then dumps him for a flashy salesman from
Las Vegas. It makes a good story and it is juicy gossip. It is simply not true. Robert
continually attempted to demonize and impugn the Petitioner. But the truth of the character
evidence is that Robert is the one that lied to the custody evaluator (ex. R. 0694, p. 345 line
15 - 346 line 8), engaged in illegal wiretapping of his wife (R. 0694 p.33 line 4 et seq.), and
was three times found in contempt of the Court.
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This case is on appeal because the Court made improper decisions regarding the best
interests of the minor children, as the children currently are left unattended in the mornings,
and are "warehoused" in the afternoons; all the while this very good mother is at home 24
hours a day being a homemaker. That does not appear to be the type of discretion that this
Court has entrusted to the trial Courts.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Olga filed a Petition seeking a divorce and custody of the parties five minor

children. She also filed a motion for temporary custody. Robert filed an Answer and
affidavit, alleging physically abusive conduct on the part of mother toward the children. The
parties agreed '"Based on [Robert's] allegations of physical abuse, to have the Court appoint a
GAL." (R. 0689 p. 3). A continuance was based solely on Robert's allegations.
2.

After his review, the GAL reported there had been a DCFS investigation. The

investigation resulted in an "unsupported finding." (R. 0690 p.7).He did not believe there
was a danger of any physical issues (R. 0691, p9 111-4).
3.

Although the claim of Olga being abusive continued to be raised by Robert,

after the De Novo hearing of March 23, 2007, the Court held: "I'm not particularly
concerned about the previous allegations of abuse and, and neglect. Having had the
circumstances explained to me a, I'm just not satisfied on any basis that there's a continuing
concern for danger to the children from the mother's behavioral parenting." (R. 0691 p.118).
4.

In T}6 of his brief, Robert claims that "Olga decided to end the marriage

because she felt that she was about to be successful in her Herbal Life business, and she did
not want to share her success with the father." That's not what the record states.

2

5.

Olga filed for divorce and custody because the family was being evicted from

their rental tenement and Robert would not disclose what the plans were. R. 180 par 12. She
feared homelessness. R. 693 p 31, 11 4-25 - p32, 11 1-11. She knew he wanted to move to
public housing in South Provo R. 693, p29, 1122-25 and she wanted something better for her
children. The divorce was already a foregone conclusion and it was the uncertainly caused by
Robert that forced Olga to take action at that time.
6.

Olga is critici2ed for having abandoned the family by securing and sleeping in

a studio apartment. (Appellee's Brief p.9, TJ13). This was after Robert moved the family of 10,
plus his mother, to a small 4 bedroom house in Orem. (R.694 line 18-25). Olga was in the
home, every day, taking care of the children from the time they got up until they went to
bed. (R. 694 p. 74). Then she would go to her apartment to sleep.
7.

In the hearing for temporary Orders, Commissioner Patton evicted Olga from

the home. (R.228 #8). After being excluded from the family home, Olga and her three
children went to Vegas (a decision supported by Judge Taylor 694, p 501, 1119-23). While
Robert claimed this as abandonment, the Court saw it as a great move for Olga and her
family.
8.

Yes, Olga had a suitor waiting in the wings, and she "married up." Regarding

marrying T o m Bradley and moving to Las Vegas, the Trial Court said: "Relocating with two
of her older children to Las Vegas to live in a home provided by Mr. Bradley was very
sensible in that she and those two children were in immediately and dramatically better
circumstances." (R. 0553).
9.

Robert claims "At the hearing on March 23, 2007, Judge Taylor awarded the
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father temporary custody during the school year, awarded the mother parent-time during the
summer, and made other orders incident thereto." (Emphasis added). That is not what the
record shows. Judge Taylor overruled the commissioner regarding the issue of sole custody
of the children to father. He said: "I'm going to order that from this point that the parents
have joint legal custody. I think that's appropriate. They both have an ongoing relationship,
concern and care for the children. I'm going to order that physical custody of the children
remain with their father until the end of the school year. . . . After the school year ends this
year, custody, physical custody, will shift to mother who will have custody through the
summer." (R. 694 p. 119).
ARGUMENT
I.

T H E TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPROPRIATELY APPLY A N D
WEIGH T H E CUSTODY FACTORS

Olga believes that the trial Court failed to properly weigh the relevant custody factors
in awarding sole custody to Robert.
In Hutchison v. Hutchison. 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 1982), the Supreme Court itemized
and affirmed some 13 separate factors that the Courts should evaluate in determinating
custody. The relative weight of the various factors was left to the discretion of the trial court.
See also: Jorgensen v. Jorgensen. Utah, 599 P.2d 510, 512 (1979)." Id. at 41. However,
despite the Appellate Courts' desire to defer to the Trial Courts, the application of the
factors and the relative weight to be given to each continues to be abused by the trial Court.
As the policy has developed, the appellate courts have directed that all factors are not
equally weighted. In Pusey v. Pusey. 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court
stated that:

4

"[T]hat the choice in competing child custody claims should instead be based on
function-related factors. Prominent among these, though not exclusive, is the identity of the
primary caretaker during the marriage. Other factors should include the identity of the parent
with greater flexibility to provide personal care for the child..." (Emphasis added).
See also: Davis v. Davis. 749 P.2d 647 (Utah 1988).
Appellee now claims that this Court has long recognized that stability for the children
trumps the "primary caretaker" factor, citing Erwin V. Erwin. 773 P2d 847; 108 Utah Adv
Rep 55; 1989 Utah A p p LEXIS 731. The Erwin Court did not so hold. In that case, the
Court was concerned with instability of mother's residence, relationships, keeping the
children together and fostering sibling bonds, open cohabitation, and the mother's past and
present demonstrated moral standards (all of which weighed in favor of father). In this case,
at the time of the trial, Olga was remarried, living in an owned home with her husband Tom,
and three children Juan, Olguita, and Mary Catherine. She was financially secure, and her
living arrangements were more secure than Robert who was living in a rental apartment,
using various forms of welfare and community assistance.
The overwhelming weight of authority direct that the primary caretaker and which
parent with greater flexibility to provide personal care for the child, are prominent factors.
And yet, in this case, there was none. The Court said: "Both of these parties were equally
engaged in the care and nurturing of these children before the divorce. (R. 0557). The Court
might just as well have said: "I reject your reality and substitute my own." There is no
analysis, no finding of fact, on this prominent issue. And it is an interesting statement in light
of the fact much of the time Robert was working two jobs (R. 693 p. 99 1113- 23), and at the
time of trial, was committed to surrogate care both before and after school. Both the Judge
and the Commissioner had previously found Mother to be the primary caretaker, and Robert
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and Olga both so testified.
But in this case, Dr. Jensen, the custody evaluator, stated that the most important
factor in this case was keeping the children in their community.1 That claim was previously
rejected by this Court in Larsen v. Larsen. 888 P.2d 719 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), discussed
infra.
The trial Court stated that Dr. Jensen's findings and observations were "adopted in
full." (R. 0560^1 2). It is one thing to allow the custody evaluator to assist the finder of fact in
determining and evaluating facts. It is plain error to allow the expert to make legal
conclusion, such as the "most important factor" to decide the case. Especially when he
applies the wrong law.
This case is more closely related to Larsen v. Larsen. 888 P.2d 719 (Utah Ct. App.
1994), cited to this Court in our principal brief. In Larsen, this Court determined that the
Trial Court erred in awarding Custody to father on the grounds that mother's move from
Park City to Oregon, to marry, would not be in the children's best interest, as it would inhibit
father's ability to maintain a parental relationship with his children, disrupt their religious
training, and remove them from their friends and relatives. This Court determined that:

i

24) Q. Okay. Now getting back to my initial question on this. What, what determination did
you make regarding that (p. 0284) factor's impact on, on your evaluation?
2) A. It a, the, the factor of greatest impact was, probably pertained less to the orders, a,
and more to the duration of time that the children had their, the children's integration a,
were the, the factors pertaining to the kids' happiness and adjustment, a, stability of residence
which were, which are factors imbedded in this criterion. The friendship relationships.
integration with schools, a. church and community, a. that were established in the a. here in
the, in the Provo area.
(R. 0694 p. 0283, 0284) (Emphasis added).
6

"The focus of the trial court's analysis and decision, then, was not on the parties'
respective parenting skills. 3 Instead, the court's order can only be taken to mean that the
trial court believed that the children's domicile in Summit County is so essential to their
well-being that removal from that community would be more detrimental to them than
separating them from their custodial parent—the person who has been primarily responsible
for their day-to-day care for the entirety of their lives. While such a conclusion is not
inherently impossible, a factor of considerable importance in determining the best interest of
children is the maintenance of continuity in their lives, and removing children from their
existing custodial placement undercuts that policy. 4 (string cite omitted). Therefore, unless
there were compelling evidence that residing in Summit County, Utah, would be better for
the children than allowing them to continue to reside with their life-long primary caregiver,
we would conclude that the trial court exceeded the exercise of sound discretion in entering
the order before us."
(n. 3. It is undisputed that both Alicia and Marc are exemplary parents, each deeply
committed to the well-being of their children."
n.4. In any event, especially in the case of younger children, the disruption of moving
with their life-long primary caregiver would usually be less detrimental than a sudden change
in who is serving that important role. Such disruption might be exacerbated in this case by
the fact that Marc's long work hours would necessitate the use of surrogate care, which has
not been present in the children's lives heretofore, although Marc testified that he would cut
back on his work hours if he had custody of the children.)"
Larsen, at 722 (Emphasis added)
In this case, the Court failed to properly weigh and apply the custody factors, had he
done so, the Court would have made a different decision regarding Custody.
At the January 16, 2007, hearing, the trial court did find that Olga being the primary
caretaker weighed in her favor. Tr. at p. 50. Similarly, at the March 23, 2007, hearing, the trial
court acknowledged Olga was in a better situation to care for the Children, as she could
provide full time constant care. Id. In both referenced hearings, the Court found no abuse
issues. These findings became the "law of the case." Yet, without notice or an opportunity to
address the issue, the Court changes his mind after trial.
Olga has greater flexibility to provide personal care for the children. Robert leaves for
work at about 5:00 a.m. while the Children sleep. (R.0694 p.22). Robert would return home
at about 7:30 am to get the Children to school and make sure the youngest Child was taken
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care of. (R.0694 pp. 22-23). At Trial, Robert testified similarly, that he does not have
someone at the house watching the Children while he is working in the morning before he
comes back to get them. Tr. at p. 436. Robert also testified the younger Children are in
daycare and the older Children attend after school programs until 5:30. Tr. at pp. 424, 428,
429, 444. Dr. Jensen testified that he understood that a surrogate caretaker was present with
the children in the morning, and that if they were unattended, that would be "inappropriate."
(R.0694 p.345 1. 2 - 346 1.8)
That is not to say that other factors cannot (or should not) be considered. In Hansen
v. Hansen. 2009 UT App. 365, this Court held that the primary caretaker is not the single
controlling factor, and while more heavily weighted than other factors, must yield where
multiple showings in other areas override the primary caretaker factor.
Judge Davis' dissent in Hansen, raises an important issue in such cases, "Reversal
would have little, if any, effect on Mother's ability to obtain a change of custody," apparently
because the error committed by the Trial Court has resulted in a de facto reversal in the
primary caretaker status of the parties so on remand, the erroneous judgment would be
affirmed. That means that the Trial Court (and by assignment, the Custodial Evaluator) are
authorized to amend the test at will, because under the current law, the failure to properly
weigh and apply the primary caretaker factor becomes non-appealable, because there is no
remedy. A remedy for that problem would be to disregard the factor of primary custody
pending trial or hearing in cases of remand, and look only toward the historical primary
caretaker.
The trial court failed to set forth objective findings of fact that Robert was the better
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parent to care for the Children and further failed in its basic facts as to why such a
conclusion was justified. Sukin v. Sukin. 842 P.2d 922, at 924. (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Respondent has claimed that Dr. Jensen spent three pages analyzing the primary
caretaker factor. (Appellee's brief, p. 22). Even a cursory review of the written evaluation
shows this is not true. Under the tide "General Interests of Continuing Previously Determined custody
Arrangements'' neither the primary caretaker role nor any analysis of which parent could
provide personal as opposed to surrogate care was mentioned. What was analyzed was
Michelle's treatment for Selective Mutism who the best treatment provider might be.
Ultimately, the evaluator said that three of the five children thought Michelle responded
move favorably to the father's approach, which apparentiy meant he was the better caretaker
in the eyes of three of five children under 10 yoa. The court never properly weighted the
function related factors of primary caretaker and which parent had greater flexibility to
provide personal care for the child.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the determination of custody in this matter.
II. T H E TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS EXCLUSION
OF APPELLANT'S EXPERT WITNESS.
A.

Dr. Hopper was prepared to Rebut Dr. Jensen's findings in the
Custody Evaluation Report.

UTAH CODE OF JUD. ADMIN.

R. 4-903(7)states as follows:

In cases in which psychological testing is employed as a component of
the evaluation, it shall be conducted by a licensed psychologist who is trained
in the use of the tests administered, and adheres to the ethical standards for
the use and interpretation of psychological tests in the jurisdiction in which he
or she is licensed to practice. If psychological testing is conducted with adults
and/or children, it shall be done with knowledge of the limits of the testing
and should be viewed within the context of information gained from clinical
interviews and other available data. Conclusions drawn from psychological
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testing should take into account the inherent stresses associated with divorce
and custody disputes.
In the instant case, Dr. Hopper was called in anticipation of trial to testify as a mixed
fact and expert witness. R0491. He had been providing care to Michelle in Las Vegas and
had evaluated Olga. In her disclosure of Dr. Hopper's proposed testimony, Olga stated as
follows:
Dr. Hopper has indicated that he has reviewed the report of Dr. Jensen, which fails to
mention or utilize any of the testing conducted. Dr. Hopper has indicated that he feels it is
not very thorough where it counts and heavy on attacks on [Olga], without reference for any
factual cause. He also said he found as strange the complete lack of mention of all the tests
the parties took. He thought the attacks on Olga, without any clinical or factual evidence to
support them, were unprofessional and outside the standard of the profession. He has
requested all testing materials, but has been delayed (or denied) by Dr. Jensen. His opinions
are subject to a final review of additional documentation to be provided by Dr. Jensen. Id.
Dr. Hopper was expected to rebut Dr. Jensen's anticipated findings concerning
Olga's psychological testing. Dr. Hopper's anticipated testimony was crucial to Olga's case,
particularly since Dr. Jensen's findings were adopted by the trial court in its Memorandum,
Findings and Conclusions, and Order. Accordingly, the main issue regarding Dr. Hopper's
testimony became whether his scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge would
assist the trial court to determine facts at issue, facts central to an award of custody. UT. R.
EVID. 702(a) and (b). See Advisory Committee Note, \ 2: "Similarly, the expert is viewed,
not in a narrow sense, but as a person qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education".
Robert argued Dr. Hopper was incompetent as a custody evaluator under Rule 493,
which provides only for social workers or licensed, doctorate level psychologists, or those
state licensed where they practice. Tr. at p. 409. Dr. Hopper is a PhD Psychologist, and runs
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a licensed facility in Las Vegas. However, Olga argued Rule 702, which does not require a
license, education, or degree, only that the witness have training, education, and/or
experience sufficient to assist the fact finder with regard to the specialized issues. Tr. at p.
410. Counsel herein argued Dr. Hopper was qualified to testify concerning the evaluation
and treatment of M.G. and of the clinical testing that was administered to Olga by Dr. Jensen
in connection to the custody evaluation. Tr. at pp. 410-411.
B.

The Trial Court's Exclusion of Dr. Hopper's Testimony Prejudiced the
Outcome of the Trial.

We note that "[t]he determination of whether there is a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable outcome is based upon a review of the record." Glacier Land Co., L.L.C. v.
Claudia Klawe & Associates. L.L.C.. 2006 UT App. 516, ^[34, 154 P.3d 852 citing State v.
Lindgren. 910 P.2d 1268, 1274 (Utah CtApp.1996). "This review requires the appellate court
to determine from the record what evidence would have been before the jury absent the trial
court's error." Id. citing Lindgren at 1274.
Olga must demonstrate prejudice resulted from the trial court's error in excluding Dr.
Hopper's testimony. As already insinuated herein, this matter was a close call and any further
information regarding the best interests of the Child, which was within Dr. Hopper's
purview, would have greatly aided the trial court in its determination of permanent custody.
Therefore, as this Court reviews the record in this matter and determines what it would have
been with Dr. Hopper's proffered testimony, Olga avers the outcome would have been
tipped in her favor.
The trial court relied upon Olga's objection to the use of Prozac for Michelle in his
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determination the parties could not effectively communicate regarding decisions involving
the Children. The trial court also found Robert seemed to be better situated to keep the lines
of communication open. However, Dr. Hopper's testimony would have demonstrated Olga's
sincere concern regarding Prozac, its dangerous effect on young children, how M.G. fared in
Las Vegas away from the area in which she was integrated, and her favorable progress on
GABA and other treatment. The trial court relied on the fact the Children's integration in the
Provo area overcame Olga's ability and right to provide personal care, particularly as it
related to M.G. Accordingly, Dr. Hopper would have given the trial court valuable insight as
to how M.G.'s feeling of integration may have changed, in response to her time in Las Vegas.
Through exclusion of Dr. Hopper's testimony, the trial court in essence left Dr.
Jensen's testimony unrebutted and thus susceptible to being erroneously adopted in its
entirety, as is argued supra. Allowing Dr. Hopper's testimony would not have worked to
prejudice Robert's case since he had an expert to rebut the matter; however, exclusion of
Olga's rebuttal witness became a crucial turning point of the trial in that the trial court did
not maintain the discretion or authority to reject Dr. Jensen's testimony in light of no other
evidence on the issues being presented. There was no weighing of the witnesses' opinions
since only one was allowed to testify, making the case very one-sided. The prejudice heaped
upon Olga through such exclusion is readily apparent.
Ultimately, Hopper found Olga to be in a better situation than Robert, and Olga
could adequately meet the needs of the Children in Las Vegas. However, the trial court
refused to allow Olga to fully demonstrate this by excluding Dr. Hopper. Hence, not only
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did the trial court commit error as argued supra but its error resulted in prejudice against Olga
in the outcome of this matter. Therefore, this matter should be reversed.
III. T H E TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO SUFFICIENTLY SET
FORTH ITS FINDINGS CONCERNING ITS AGREEMENT WITH A N D
DEVIATION FROM DR. JENSEN'S REPORT.
Dr. Jensen recommended Joint legal custody, and the Court rejected that
recommendation, and further, restricted parent time. UT. CODE ANN. § 30-3-10.1 (1) defines
"Joint legal custody" as follows:
[T]he sharing of the rights, privileges, duties, and powers of a parent by both
parents, where specified; (b) may include an award of exclusive authority by
the court to one parent to make specific decisions; (c) does not affect the
physical custody of the child except as specified in the order of joint legal
custody; (d) is not based on awarding equal or nearly equal periods of physical
custody of and access to the child to each of the parents, as the best interest of
the child often requires that a primary physical residence for the child be
designated; and (e) does not prohibit the court from specifying one parent as
the primary caretaker and one home as the primary residence of the child.
UT. CODE ANN. §30-3-10.1(2) defines "Joint physical custody" is as follows:
[T]he child stays with each parent overnight for more than 30% of the year,
and both parents contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to paying
child support; (b) can mean equal or nearly equal periods of physical custody
of and access to the child by each of the parents, as required to meet the best
interest of the child; (c) may require that a primary physical residence for the
child be designated; and (d) does not prohibit the court from specifying one
parent as the primary caretaker and one home as the primary residence of the
child.
This Court has stated, "[w]e first note that child custody evaluations in divorce cases
are specifically provided for by Rule 4-903, Utah Code of Judicial Administration (1990). The
rule provides that the evaluator cshall submit a written report to the court,' and thereby
clearly contemplates that such reports will be used in making custody determinations."
Merriam v. Merriam. 799 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Utah App.,1990) (further citations omitted.) "In
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divorce cases where custody is at issue, one evaluator may be appointed by the court to
conduct an impartial and objective assessment of the parties and submit a written report to
the court." UTAH CODE OF JUD.ADMIN.R. 4-903(4). The rule continues as follows:

UTAH

The purpose of the custody evaluation will be to provide the court with
information it can use to make decisions regarding custody and parenting time
arrangements that are in the child's best interest. This is accomplished by
assessing the prospective custodians' capacity to parent, the developmental,
emotional, and physical needs of the child, and the fit between each
prospective custodian and child. Unless otherwise specified in the order,
evaluators must consider and respond to each of the following factors:
(5)(A) the child's preference; (5)(B) the benefit of keeping siblings
together; (5)(C) the relative strength of the child's bond with one or
both of the prospective custodians; (5)(D) the general interest in
continuing previously determined custody arrangements where the
child is happy and well adjusted; (5)(E) factors relating to the
prospective custodians' character or status or their capacity or
willingness to function as parents, including: (5)(E)(i) moral character
and emotional stability; (5)(E)(ii) duration and depth of desire for
custody; (5)(E)(iii) ability to provide personal rather than surrogate
care; (5)(E)(iv) significant impairment of ability to function as a parent
through drug abuse, excessive drinking or other causes; (5)(E)(v)
reasons for having relinquished custody in the past; (5)(E)(vi) religious
compatibility with the child; (5)(E)(vii) kinship, including in
extraordinary circumstances stepparent status; (5)(E)(viii) financial
condition; and (5)(E)(ix) evidence of abuse of the subject child, another
child, or spouse; and (5)(F) any other factors deemed important by the
evaluator, the parties, or the court.
C O D E O F JUD.ADMIN.R. 4-903(5).
In the instant case, the parties could not resolve the issue of custody themselves. In

its fact-finding concerning custody, the trial court determined to diverge from Dr. Jensen's
final recommendations, but adopted his findings and observations. R0560. Dr. Jensen
testified that, in regard to the factor of the strength of attachment to the Children to their
parents, Dr. Jensen found this to be a nondifferientiating criteria. Tr. at pp. 283-284. Dr.
Jensen evaluated the general interest of continuing the previously determined custody
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arrangement and found the Children's integration in the Provo area was the most important
factor and central to the Children's adjustment Tr. at pp. 284-285. Dr. Jensen additionally
testified that, (A) concerning M.G. and her need for treatment, there was concern with
having two (2) different treating professionals in the two (2) different areas in which the
Children lived; (B) there were hiccups in the communication between Cannon and Dr.
Hopper and they were not necessarily unified in their approach to treatment; (C) proximity
of residence that preserves the Children's integration is clearly in the best interest of the
Children; (D) Olga had the slight advantage over Robert in her ability to provide personal
care to the Children; and (E) he based his recommendation the Children stay in Provo on
more than the desires of the Children, specifically that they are integrated there. R.0694 at
pp. 287-288, 290-291, 299, 334. Dr. Jensen testified it was a very close case. R.0694 at p. 343.
Dr. Jensen ultimately recommended Joint legal custody with Robert designated the
primary residential parent. Dr. Jensen testified he hoped M.G. could remain in therapy with
Cannon; however, a change occurred but did not impact his custody recommendations.
R.0694 p. 320.
Dr. Jensen recommended the parties share joint custody, where Olga and Robert
would share the rights, privileges, duties, and powers of a parent. UT. CODE ANN. §30-310.1(1). However, the trial court granted sole physical and legal custody to Robert indicating
it was based on Dr. Jensen's custody evaluation, but failed to make any specific findings on
the variance of declining to order joint legal custody.
Dr. Jensen was presumed to have conducted an impartial and objective assessment of
the parties, and he submitted his resulting written report to the trial court. CODE OF
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JUD.ADMIN.R. 4-903(4). Dr. Jensen was required to consider a myriad of factors in his
report, some of which he found to be nondifferientiating and others to weigh in favor of a
party, as already described herein. However, in arriving at its conclusion regarding custody,
the trial court did not make any findings regarding the reason for variance, even though it
determined to adopt Dr. Jensen's findings. See, R0560.
While UTAH CODE OF JUD.ADMIN.R. 4-903(5) does not bind a trial court to an
evaluation report, the report is presumed to be relied on by a trial court in making its custody
determination, particularly since the evaluator must perform an impartial and objective
assessment of the parties. See, UTAH CODE OFjUD.ADMIN.R. 4-903 (4). Accordingly, the trial
court's failure to make specific findings as to its divergence from Dr. Jensen's
recommendation that the parties share legal custody constituted error in light of the weight
afforded to custody evaluator reports. Thus, the award of sole physical and legal custody to
Robert should be reversed.
IV. T H E TRIAL COURT ERRED IMPOSING RESTRICTIVE PARENT TIME
A N D REJECTING DR. JENSEN'S VISITATION RECOMMENDATION
This Court has stated, "[w]hen the parents cannot agree on a visitation arrangement,
the Utah Code delineates minimum parent-time schedules." Trubetzkoy v. Trubetzkoy. 2009
UT App. 77, fl4,205 citing U T A H

CODE ANN.

§30-3-35(2).

The minimum schedule for parent-time for children 5-18 years of age is outlined
under UT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-3-35 and 30-3-37(5). In Udy v. Udy. this Court analyzed a trial
court's award of expanded visitation under statute to the noncustodial parent. Ibid., 893 P.2d
1097, 1101 (Utah App.,1995). The custodial parent appealed, arguing the trial court had
abused its discretion; however, the court determined the appellant had not presented
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evidence to rebut the testimony of experts who recommended the schedule. Id. In this case,
the Court amended the schedule, and did not explain why neither the statutory scheme nor
the evaluator's recommendation was followed.
Dr. Jensen ultimately recommended at trial that the parties be awarded Joint Legal
Custody, (A) the Children remain in Provo and continue to reside with Robert; (B) Olga
received holiday visits and frequent parent-time with the Children, but to avoid full
Summers; and (C) half-summer visits with Olga occur. Tr. at pp. 310-312. Dr. Jensen
testified he was deviating from the standard visitation schedule as his proposed schedule
would provide predictability, long term scheduling and longevity. Tr. at p. 318. Dr. Jensen
testified he hoped M.G. could remain in therapy with Cannon; however, a change occurred
but did not impact his custody recommendations. By the time of trial, Cannon had left
Provo and moved to Salt Lake City. Tr. at p. 320. Jensen recommended that Olga get seven
(7) weeks in the summer, holidays and one visit per month. See exhibit "A."
In its divergence from Dr. Jensen's recommendations, the trial court ordered: Robert
to have the following holidays every year: Martin Luther King weekend; Spring Break;
Pioneer Day, and; Labor Day Weekend. Olga to have the following holidays every year:
President's Day weekend; Memorial Day weekend; Independence Day, and; Fall Break.
Robert was awarded Thanksgiving in odd numbered years and Christmas break in even
numbered years. Olga was awarded Thanksgiving in even numbered years and awarded
Christmas in odd numbered years. Olga was awarded summer parent time beginning every
year the day after Father's Day and ending July 23rd at 9:00 p.m. Order at pp. 3-4.
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Based on the parties' visitation disagreements, the trial court was required to apply a
minimum parent-time schedule. Trubetzkoy at ^[14. However, the trial court granted
substantially restricted parent time and failed to specify why he was doing so. In fact, the
Court said: "substantial parent time should be awarded to the non-custodial parent."
Although the trial Court gave Olga less than half of the statutory parent time, he apparentiy
felt like he had given her an expanded parent time role.
Simply put, Utah Code §30-3-37(5) provides "...the minimum requirements for
parent-time with a school-age child." The trial court gave less and failed to explain why.
V. T H E TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS FOR
ROBERT'S CONTEMPT OF COURT.
Robert was found in contempt of Court on three separate occasions. In each
finding of contempt, the Court reserved the issue of sanctions (with the exception of an
"order" to comply with a prior "order" by paying a reduced sum of $175 per month), and
attorney's fees were reserved for trial. At trial, sanctions and attorney's fees were summarily
denied on the grounds that Robert could not afford to pay. Robert now defends the trial
courts ruling, directing this Court to §30-3-3(1) and the "Jones factors." Robert fails to even
address Olga's claims pursuant to the long standing policy of our Courts to impose sanctions
to enforce compliance with our Courts' orders. Robert cites Utah Code 30-3-3(1), as support
for the Trial Court's decision. The proper authority is Utah Code §30-3-3(2), and the
authority in Appellant's principal brief.
In January, 2008, this Court decided the case of Anderson v. Thompson, in which it
was stated as follows:
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Because of Husband's noncompliance with multiple provisions
of the Decree, the trial court held Husband in contempt of
court and awarded judgment to Wife in the amount of $ 44,311.
In addition, the trial court awarded Wife $ 7652.97 in attorney
fees based on the court's finding that 'attorney fees are justified
and necessary and reasonable.' Husband appealed. This Court
reversed the finding of Attorney's fees because the "trial court
did not enter sufficient findings on the reasonableness of Wife's
attorney fees or Wife's need for such fees.
Ibid., 2008 UT App 3, 176 P3d 464. The analysis of this Court was referenced as
having been based not on the contempt statute or case law, but instead on UTAH CODE
ANN. §30-3-3(1), which provides that a trial court "may order a party to pay the costs,
attorney fees, and witness fees . . . of the other party to enable the other party to prosecute or
defend the action." Id. at 475. This is the wrong standard for Contempt sanctions.
Even if this Court adopts the discretionary function of the Judge under §30-3-3(2),
the Trial Court made no finding of Robert's impecuniosity. Olga also testified Robert had
been working two (2) jobs at the time she filed for divorce but had quit one (1) subsequent
to filing. Tr. at p. 100. Robert was resourceful in obtaining help for the Children's care and
assistance from various outside sources to make up the difference between what he was
earning and what was needed to provide for their family. Tr. at pp. 138-139. Robert would
rely on Olga's income so he could work less and still rely in welfare assistance to make ends
meet. Tr. at pp. 148-149. Robert was capable of manipulating his income.
The trial court ultimately determined Robert was unable to pay. R0648. However,
such determination was against evidence presented at trial, summarily that Robert
purposefully relies on welfare to make ends meet and does have the ability to pay Olga's
attorney's fees, particularly since he had worked two (2) jobs throughout the marriage. This

19

Court needs to make a determination whether impecuniosity is a "free pass" to commit
contempt and refuse to comply with the Court's orders, or whether the "Jones Factors" are
required to find contempt under §30-3-3(2), as implied in Anderson.
VI. APPELLANT HAS PROPERLY MARSHALED T H E EVIDENCE.
In point 7 of his brief, Robert claims that the Olga has failed to marshal the evidence
in support of the trial courts' decisions. Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(9), a party challenging the trial
courts' finding of fact must marshal all record evidence which supports the challenged
finding. Olga has met this burden, although the marshaling of the evidence may not be
mandated in this case since her challenges on appeal are directed at conclusions of law. In
this case, Olga properly summarized the testimony of each and every witness in both pretrial
proceedings and the trial itself, summarized all documentary evidence as it related to the
findings of the Court, and provided the trial courts' findings in connection therewith.
Robert cannot and does not specify one single fact which he believes supports the
trial courts' decision that Olga did not touch upon. Olga's challenges pertain to the improper
application of the custody factors analysis, specifically as it relates to the weight to be given
to various elements. While Robert claims the trial court was exhaustive in its analysis of the
primary care taker of the Children, he ignores the fact that this was found by all to be a
traditional household, with the father as the primary bread winner and the mother as the
primary care provider for the Children [Brief p. 27, 28 ].
Olga provided a comprehensive statement of facts to this Court and has fully satisfied
her obligation to marshal the evidence. Robert's claim otherwise should be rejected and a
determination made on the merits of the issues.
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VI. T H E ISSUE OF CHILD SUPPORT IS PROPERLY
BEFORE THIS COURT.
Olga claims that the trial court erroneously refused to adopt and utilize the "low
income table" set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. §78b-12-302. Robert claims that Olga failed to
property preserve or raise the issue of child support in connection with this action. R. 0621
see TJ 9. Attached hereto as exhibit "B". However, Olga raised the issue of child support
below in both her Petition and Complaintfor Divorce, which requested reasonable child support,
and her July 29, 2008, filing of a Motion to Alter, Amend or Supplement Findings of Fact and
Conclusions ofYjzw, arguing the trial court failed to consider statutory issues relating to child
support. Robert's claims of failure to preserve the issue are thus flawed.
The Utah Child support act provides, in part:
§78B-12-205. Calculation of obligations.
(1) Each parent's child support obligation shall be established in
proportion to their adjusted gross incomes, unless the low
income table is applicable../9
(2) Except in cases . . . where the obligor's adjusted gross
income is $1,050 or less monthly, the base child support award
shall be determined as follows: (sub (a) and (b) omitted as not
applicable).
(4) In cases where the monthly adjusted gross income of either
parent is between $650 and $1.050. the base child support award
shall be the lesser of the amount calculated in accordance with
Subsection (2) and the amount calculated using the low income
table. If the income and number of children is found in an area
of the low income table in which no amount is shown, the base
combined child support obligation table is to be used.
(Emphasis added)
This Court determined Olga's income at the time of the trial to be $623.04 per
month, to which she objected based upon the analysis given by the trial court, and indicated
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that the proper computation was $539.70 per month. This claim was rejected by the Trial
Court and is not appealed here.
The primary issue is whether or not the Court should have utilized the "low income
tables contained at UTAH CODE ANN. §78b-12-302. By it's express terms, -302 applies to
"the obligor parent only" in the event the obligor parent currently earns less that $1050 per
month for the purpose of child support. Olga filed a motion to alter, amend or supplement
the trial courts' findings and conclusions requesting recalculation of child support. Following
the Court's ruling on that Order, Appellant sent a letter to the Court on March 19, 2009, [R.
622] and attached a formal objection to the proposed order [R. 621] specifically referencing
the Courts failure to adopt the low income tables of §78b-12-302, which should have
resulted in a child support obligation of $31 per month. On or about March 20, 2009, the
Court issued a signed minute entry wherein the Court declined to make further changes, but
noted that the remaining issues were "resolved by the incorporation of its Memorandum
Decision by reference." [p.24 P. 9] [R. 0624, 0625]. However, the trial courts' Memorandum
Decision only references the issue of joint physical and legal custody of the Children and
parent time. The trial court failed to ever consider the issue of the adjustment of child
support and the use of the low income tables, despite that fact having been directly being
brought to its attention.
VII. APPELLEE FAILED TO ADEQUATELY PRESERVE HIS ISSUES
THROUGH CROSS-APPEAL I N THIS MATTER.
Appellee claims the trial court erred in failing to "impute income" to Olga, or in the
alternative, by failing to calculate some or all of the income of her husband to her as income
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for the purpose of calculating child support. Robert seems to be making an affirmative claim,
which should have been brought by cross-appeal.
Robert raised this issue at the trial of the case. R. 0694 p. 0493. Robert now tries to
advance this exact issue on appeal.
Robert filed no affirmative claim, filed no cross-appeal under UT. R. APP. P. 4(d), but
now seeks to overturn the trial court's ruling on his issue. Any request for affirmative relief,
which is not merely offered as a ground for affirming the trial court, is not properly before
the Court unless a proper cross-appeal has been filed. Since this affirmative issue is not
properly before the Court, Olga will decline the invitation to brief this issue. The only error
committed by the Court was in failing to adopt the statutory scheme, as argued supra.
VIII. T H E APPEAL IS N O RENDERED MOOT BY T H E TEMPORARY
ORDERS ISSUED IN T H E MOTHER'S PETITION TO MODIFY.
A father makes the claim that the appeal is moot as a result of a Stipulation reached
by the Parties for a Temporary Order during the pendency of Petition to Modify, this results
from the mother moving from Las Vegas to Provo, and the father's denial of visitation
because it was not provided for in the Custody Decree. He adds very litde analysis. It is
interesting to note that the Order attached to the brief is not even the current Order in effect
in this case. See Attached as exhibit "C."
"This Court has stated that an issue only becomes moot when the requested judicial
relief can not effect the rights of the litigants." Winters v. Schulman, 1999 UT App. 119; 977
P.2d 1218. The issue in this case is not moot for multiple reasons. First, the Decree of
Divorce is still in effect providing for a specific schedule of visitation if the mother resides in
Las Vegas, Nevada. Second, the current Order in effect is "Temporary." Third, the Order
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only alters local visitation under Utah Code § 30-3-35. Finally, even if the requested relief
were deemed to render moot the issue of visitation or custody, or be seen as a waiver of
custody, this case would constitute an exception to the general rule governing mootness.2
For example, this issue has already arisen without remedy in Hansen and Larsen, saved only
by this Court affirming the trial court decisions.
This case presents an issue that effects virtually every contested custody case to heard
in the future. Should this Court decide that the Court wrongfully decided the issue of
custody, and that custody should be transferred to the mother, mother would not be granted
non-custodial parent time pursuant to § 30-3-35, as she would be designated the custodial
parent. Finally, a change in custody by this court, or a remand, would constitute a substantial
and material change upon which the Order for Temporary Parent Time had been granted,
and would justify a re-evaluation at the Trial Court of that issue as well.
In the alternative, a remand in light of the general change in circumstances of the
Parties, with the Petitioner now residing in the same neighborhood the Parties occupied at
the time of the separation, should justify a remand and redetermination of the issues of
custody, joint custody , and parent time.

2

Exceptions to mootness include that the issue is one of wide public concern, and because of

the short period any one litigant is affected by it, the issue is "'capable of repetition yet evading review.'"
Id.; see also KUTV v. Conder, 668 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1983); Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 899-900
(Utah 1981).

~>A

CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Olga respectfully requests t at this Cc urt
reverse the Order in this matter and take any such further action as this Court de us neo ss ry.
DATED this 27* day of July, 2010.

'G. Clark, Attorney t Law
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 27th day ofJuly, 2010,1 served and true and c .rrect o >p) of
the Brief of Appellant, first-class mailing, postage prepaid and addressed as folio *:
Guy L. Black
GREENWOOD & BLACK
1840 North State Street, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604

JAMES^r. Clark, Attorney tLaw
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Exhibit "A"

1

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT - PROVO COURT

2

UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3
4

PETITIONER

5
6
7

TWO DAY BENCH TRIAL

OLGA LUCIA GRINDSTAFF,

JUNE 3, 2008 SESSION
DAY 2 OF 2

vs.
ROBERT LEE GRINDSTAFF,

CASE
APPEAL

064402197
20090505-CA

8
RESPONDENT

JUDGE JAMES R. TAYLOR

9
10
11
12
13
14

BE IT REMEMBERED

that this matter came on for hearing

before the above-named court on

June 2 and 3, 2008.

WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by
counsel, the following proceedings were held:

15
16
17

OFFICIAL CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT

18

(From Electronic Recording)

19
20
21
22

ORIGINAL

23
24

uTAH APPELLATE COURTS

25

M

PENNY C. ABBOTT, REPORTER-TRANSCRIBER
LIC. 102811-7801
,c,i, Q b ^
PHONE: (801) 423-6463 EMAIL: abbpe@yahoo.com
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1

availability without a, making the children a, suffer the

2

consequences of that, which is very difficult to do without

3

residences being close to one another.

4

of that is a moving target because a, there is some

5

uncertainty about the sacrifices that parents are willing to

6

make a, when it really, when the rubber hits the road

7

literally.

8

between homes can sometimes be monumental a, in terms of

9

costs to families.

10

And a, with accelerated gas prices, the distance

Who would, who would have the greater ability in

11

this case to a, to pay for a, or be able to afford the a, the

12

a, cost of the gas and the trips to visit the children?

13

A.

Certainly Olga and Tom have the greater financial

14

ability.

15

employment, that he's established himself effectively, and a,

16

that the possibility, the ease of moving at the time, the

17

ease of his moving away from his career or, career and what

18

he had developed there was also not a very good option a,

19

for him in order to reestablish a residence here and continue

20

his employment without being on the road traveling all the

21

time.

22
23

0310

Q.

And so a, I, some

Q.

But I also appreciated Tom's a, history of a,

Okay.

So it would be your recommendation then

that the children remain here in Provo.

Is that correct?

24

A.

That's correct.
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Q.

And, and that they reside principally with their

1

father?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

And, and in terms of parent time for Olga a, what

4

a, what would you recommend in that regard?

5

If you can be as specific as possible regarding that^

6

recommendation.

7

A.

I think to take care, I think a, to take care of

8

maintaining regularity of contact, to try and build a contact

9

around red lettered holidays for her to travel to see the

10

children.

11

tends to prioritize the children's relationships with

12

parents over their children's integration and development of

13

skills and involvements in the community.

14

0311

Specifically.

To be careful about a, full summers away, a, that

A lot of kids a, when they, as they get older they

15

have more and more involvements which they have to

16

sacrifice.

17

will be particularly important for them to have a,

18

opportunities to build skills and value themselves in a, in

19

various areas of their interests.

And a, here we have a number of daughters who it

20

Sometimes a, when we create parent time

21

arrangements in the summer we still make the kids make all

22

the sacrifices.

23

that a, because of the, in the name of their relationship

24

with parents.

25

Q.

And I would, I discourage people from doing

So, so you don't recommend that we engage in a

2

that—

3

A.

I do not.

4

Q.

—

5
6
7

what I you saying?

What, what do you recommend for these children in
terms of parent time during the summer?
A.

I'd say half the summer and a, and try and build

8

more frequent parent time throughout the year for frequent

9

regularity of contact.

Take advantage of red letter

Encourage the kids to stay a, up in school,

10

holidays.

11

perform well in school so that they can be withdrawn from

12

school to expand time.

13

in both homes a,

14

time their education will be supported.

15

regularly with teachers a, to make sure work is in, and be,

16

for both parents to be really involved with the schools.

17
18
19

Q.

Okay.

Support the kids in their education

so that when they do leave a, for periods of
And a, confer

Would you also recommend that for this, this

summer that's just beginning?
A.

Well, I would.

The other problem that occurs

20

when a, when we, with...

The problem with visitation

21

generally is it creates artificial experiences.

22

often create a parent nonparent phenomenon where the kids

23

come to idealize a parent in a nonparental role.

24

what it would be like if I lived here, we would be having

25

fun, it would be in the summer, I'm not stressed, I'm not

We, we

This is

1

in school a, and my parents are not working, we're

2

maximizing our time together, we're having a lot of fun, so

3

on and so forth.

4

flipflop thing they would experience that parent and

5

themselves under the stress of school, following through with

6

homework, and the parent having to a, take time with them

7

during work time.

8

creating in children an artificial understanding of real

9

families*

10
11

9.
a,

But the reality of it is if there was a

And so those issues a, are dangerous for

I notice on page 29 of your, this is in the actual

recommendation itself, you indicate that you recommend the

12

children spend the entire period to commence the day after

13

Father's Day until the children return to Utah, or 1 guess

14

the start of the school year, that they spend that with

15

jfoeir mother.

16

recommendation is?
* •

Ml

I

»

I

17

nA.

18

Q.

!••

•

I,

I

I

Is that correct?

• •

••III

I...I

Is that what your

•

Yes.
Why did you, why did you set it up that way?

19

why do you think that's better for the children?

20

just an arbitration designation on your part?

21

A.

Why,

Or is that

I think they're young enough now to do it.

But it

22

creates a discomfort that it's a pattern that's established

23

permanently a, that as they, as they become teens, a, that

24

it's, it's really sacrificial a, to, to create schedules like

25

the one that's proposed here.

1

Q.

That it is or is not sacrificial?

2

A.

It is sacrificial in the long-term to have the full

3

summer with, in one environment away from friends.

4

disintegrating.

5

Q.

I understand that.

Itfs

I'm just, I'm asking, you set

6

up, you recommend a specific schedule for the summer where

7

the father would have the children until the day after

8

Father's Day and then they go down to Las Vegas to be with

9

the mother.

10

A.

Uh-huh (affirmative).

11

Q.

—

12

A.

That, that gives a slightly briefer period with the

13
14

Do you see where I'm reading—

on page 29?

father a, in that summer.
Q.

And would you recommend that that be, that that

15

period be the same every single year that a, that we not have

16

a, a flexible summer schedule but that the children have that

17

same schedule every year?

18

A.

I don't like those kind of schedules because a,

19

they ignore the children's a, needs and wants and changes to

20

the family in terms of making it permanent.

21

understand the need a, and the requirement of them in order

22

to come back to court to modify a schedule.

23

Q.

But I

Well, do you think it would minimize conflict

24

between the parties if there was a fixed schedule for summer

25

visitation?

1

A.

By all means it would, yes.

2

Q.

Would, would that outweigh the flexibility in this

3
4

case?
A.

Yes.

I don't want to organize them into

5

conflict.

6

to them to, to listen to their kids and, and their kids needs

7

with respect to things.

8
9

I... At the same time I, I would make an appeal

THE JUDGE:
break.

Why don't...

Counsel, we*re at a time to take a
Let's take a break, you can assess

10

where you are then wrap it up and Mr. Clark can cross after a

11

10 minute break.

12
13

THE JUDGE

Please be seated.

14

MR. BLACK

I'll go retrieve him.

15

THE JUDGE

Thanks.

16

Q.

(MR. BLACK:)

Go ahead.

We were discussing I think before

17

we left a, the summer parent time that you would recommend

18

for the children in this case.

19

correct me if I'm wrong, but I think it was your

20

And a, I think it was,

recommendation that the children spend a, the summer until
-

21

the day after Father's Day with their father in Utah.

22

that correct?

23

A.

(THE WITNESS:)

24

Q.

And then that they go with their mother after that

25
0315

(Recess)

Is

That's correct.

for the rest of the summer?

1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

At the end of the summer what would be your

3

recommendation regarding when the children should be

4

returned?

5

A,

The day before school?

The week before school?

A week before school, at least a few days before

6

school so that a, they can sort of...

It's a good idea to

7

get back in time for them to go into the school, meet

8

their teachers.

9

a, identifies that day.

Usually the school calendar gives that day
That would be the date I would have

10

them at least the day before that day that they go to school

11

to meet the teachers and—

12

Q.

Okay.

And, and you also had said in, in your

13

recommendation that a, Robert would, should be permitted to

14

schedule two consecutive uninterrupted weeks of parent time

15

with the children each summer.

16

Is that correct?

I guess, I guess my question in that regard is a,

17

do you anticipate that the court would have interrupted

18

parent time from the beginning of summer until Father's Day

19

or not?

20

A.

Well, and it would be difficult to do a, and meet

21

the requirements of this statement actually.

22

if the children were to go after, after Father's Day then

23

they will not have been out of school for a full a, two...

24

Okay.

25

Q.

I guess, I guess—

Because a,

1

A,

No.

2

Q.

—

3

A.

I was thinking four.

my confusion i s —
I was thinking in terms of

4

statute.

5

consecutive uninterrupted weeks of parent time—

6

Q.
- ^

7
8
9

M

So no, that's consistent.

They would have two

In addition to that first half of the summer or as

~ — — — — — — —

- — — * ~ " — ™ *

'

'

i ^ — ^ ^ — ^ ^ . . .

part of that first half of the summer?
A.

I think a, as part of that first half thatthat

time would be uninterrupted time.

10

Q.

Okay.

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

What about Mother's Day?

13

A.

Mother's D a y —

14

Q.

Oh, that would be before the end of the summer.

15

A.

—

16

Q.

My mistake.

17

A.

Right.

18

Q.

Okay.

19

^

So that entire time would be uninterrupted?

typically takes place in May.

So you don't and anticipate there will by

interruptions during that first half of the summer—

20

A.

No.

21

Q.

—

22

A.

No.

for the mother to come visit?
And I don't anticipate, I mean, I believe

23

that a, I believe the kids would handle the schedule pretty

24

well of, of what would basically amount to four weeks, close

25

to four weeks with Dad of summer parent time.

Of course,

1

this year it would have only been three, about three.

2

and then the remainder with, with the mother would be

3

another seven weeks.

4

weeks without parent time a, away from Mr

5

Q.

Okay.

And a^

I think they'll handle seven, seven

Do you...

F^t-hpr i s finp.

Specifically holidays I noticed

6

on page 28 you, you indicated certain holidays that a, and

7

your division of holidays.

8
9
10
11

Have you followed the standard a, out-of-state
parent schedule for those holidays that you've specified or
have you deviated somewhat from those?
A.

Well, I attempted to persuade the legislature this

12

past legislative session to fix the holidays and rather than

13

rotating them so that a, because they can be rather equally

14

distributed for parents.

15

So that's what you have here is a fixing of the

16

holidays a, in accordance with, you know, to, so they

17

wouldn't have to a, rotate them.

18

with the exception of how complimentary they are to one

19

another.

20

Q.

And it's rather arbitrary

And, and the reason, just for the court's sake,

21

what reason would you give for deviating from the standard

22

schedule in this case?

23

A.

Predictability, long-term scheduling and

24

longevity.

The longevity of fixed holidays allows parents

25

a, to have holidays you're always going to have.

And when
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March 19,2009

Honorable James R. Taylor
Fourth Judicial Center
125 North 100 West
Provo, Utah 84601
Re: Grindstaff v. Grindstaff, 4th District Civil No.^64402197 \
Your Honor.
Your research clerk called and asked if we had any objections to the Documents prepared
by Mr- Black. Rather than filing post judgment motions or proceedings after the documents are
signed, we are providing our objections herewith.
I thank you for the opportunity to attempt to resolve these issues before the final Orders
are entered in this case.
Sincerel;

JAKIES G. CLARK
utorney at Law
enclosure
cc: Attorney Guy Black
JGC/

.

JAMES G. CLARK, USB #3637
Attorney for Petitioner
43 East 200 North
Provo, UT 84606
Telephone: (801) 375-1717
Facsimile: (801)375-1172
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
OLGA LUCIA GRINDSTAFF
Petitioner,

ROBERT LEE GRINDSTAFF,

]>
)
]

OBJECTION TO RESPONDENT'S
PROPOSED ORDER

) Civil No. 064402197
) Judge Taylor

Respondent.

COMES NOW the Petitioner, by and through counsel James G. Clark, and hereby objects
to the Proposed Order prepared by the Respondent in connection with the Trial and the Hearing
heard on or about January 30,2009. Petitioner provides the following objections.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Paragraph 2 Respondent refers to the Petitioner (Olga Grindstaff) as "hereinafter

Mr. Grindstaff." See Paragraph 2.
2.

Mr. Grindstaff has not remarried as of the time of the trial, also an apparent

drafting error in paragraph 2.
3.

Paragraph 3 lists the Petitioner as "(hereinafter "Mrs. Bradley")." This is correct,

but does not track with the case heading and style, which lists the Petitioner as Olga Lucia
Grindstaff.

4.

On page 3, line 1, the word "that" should be "than."

5.

Paragraph 14 imputes income to Olga based on the average of her last two years

gross reported income "which is, for child support purposes, 623.04 per month." Her income ft#
2006 was 6619.80 and for 2007 was 6333.10 per paragraph 13. The average is therefore 6476.45
/12 « $539.70 per month (call it $540).
6.

Paragraph 15 is still incorrect. Olga has three children living at home with her, an

adult daughter and 14 year old son from a prior relationship, and an infant child from her present
marriage. The second sentence references "another child petitioner had from a prior
relationship..." This creates the impression that Juan, the 14 year old child, does not reside with
his mother. He does.
7.

The calculations of Paragraph 18 are incorrect, as per paragraph 14fs incorrect

figures. The present family credit should be $33.00.
8.

Total family income in Paragraph 19 should be $3,283.00

9.

Per Paragraph 19, child support under the standard tables would be $165.00, but

Olga's income falls into the low income tables of §78B-12-302, resulting in a child support
obligation of $30 / month, per the statutory and administrative guidelines of sectjon^302^
10.

Paragraph 21 adopts Dr. Jensen's recommendations for Parent time "for the most

part," but the court expressly has rejected both the joint custody recommendation and the parent
time recommendation which was testified to by Dr. Jensen.
11.

The specific Order of the Court failed to adopt the parent time statutes set forth in

Utah Code §30-3-35 and §30-3-37. Section 30-3-34 sets forth a presumption: "The advisory
guidelines as provided in Section 30-3-33 and the parent-time schedule as provided in Sections

30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5 shall be presumed to be in the best interests of the child." While
presumptions can be rebutted, the proposed findings fail to adopt a factual analysis to reject the
statutory presumption.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
12.

The conclusions of law should likewise be amended in paragraph 19 to provide

for statutory support in the amount of $30 per month.
13.

Paragraph 22 imposes the cost and obligation of transporting the children for

parent time purposes on the mother, Petitioner. However, the findings of fact do not specify that
the factors of §30-3-37(4)(a) - (d), which are required findings by the Court.
FINAL ORDER
1.

The final Order contains a provision in paragraph 15 that Olga is entitled to parent

time with the children if she is in Utah "assuming it does not interfere with Mr. GrindstafFs time
with the children. This provision is ambiguous and is not supported by the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law set forth above.
2.

The child support amount set forth in Paragraph 20 is not consistent with the

statutory child support guidelines, as set forth above.
DATED AND SIGNED this (j_

day of March, 2009.

JAMBS G. CLARK
Attorney for Olga Grindstaff

3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document
as follows:
^
_^mailed a true and correct copy of (he foregoing first class postage prepaid and
addressed as follows; or
hand-delivered to the following: or
sent by facsimile to the following:
GUY L. BLACK
1840 N. State Street, Ste 200
Provo, UT 84604

if

t»

DATED AND SIGNED this XL day of March, 2009.
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GUY L. BLACK, No. 6182
GREENWOOD & BLACK
Attorneys for Respondent
1840 North State Street, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone (801)377-4652
Facsimile- (801) 377-4673
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

OLGA LUCIA GRINDSTAFF

AMENDED ORDER ON MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY ORDERS

Petitioner,
Civil No 064402197
vs.
ROBERT LEE GRINDSTAFF,

Judge: Taylor
Commissioner. Patton

Respondent.

This matter came before the Court, Commissioner Thomas Patton presiding, on
November 30, 2009. Petitioner was present and represented by counsel, James G. Clark.
Respondent was present and represented by counsel, Guy L. Black The parties reached an
agreement regarding the Motion in this matter. The parties' agreement was stated by counsel on
the record, and each party consented on the record Based upon the parties' agreement, and good
cause appearing, it is HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS.
1.

Respondent, Robert Lee GrindstafT, shall retain physical and legal custody of the

parties' minor children.
2.

Except as otherwise set forth in this order, Petitioner, Olga Lucia Bradley, shall be

entitled to parent time with the parties' minor children in accordance with Section 30-3-35, Utah
Code Annotated.
3.

The Petitioner may participate in the children's school activities and functions,

provided she does so appropriately and without interference with the children's education or
activities.
4.

For the next sixty (60) days,fromNovember 30, 2009 through January 31, 2010,

the Petitioner's parent-time shall be altered somewhat, as follows:
a.

During that sixty-day period, in lieu of Petitioner's midweek visit, the

Petitioner shall have the children on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday evening
from the time the children are dropped off at the Petitioner's house, as specified in
paragraph 4.c, infra, until 8:00 p.m.
b.

During that sixty-day period, Petitioner shall deliver the children to

Respondent's home ward for church services at the beginning of those services,
and shall retrieve the children from Respondent's home ward at the end of those
services. The children shall attend church services in Respondent's home ward
every Sunday.
c.

The parties' children participate in an after-school program each day after

school. Notwithstanding the foregoing parent-time schedule, Petitioner's parent
time shall commence only after all of the children havefinishedtheir after-school
program. If all of the children havefinishedthe after-school program by 4:00
p.m., then the Respondent shall deliver the children to Petitioner's home at that
-2-

time. If the children have not allfinishedthe after-school program by 4:00 p.m.,
then the Respondent shall deliver the children to the Petitioner's home after all the
children arefinishedat 5:30 p.m During Petitioner's midweek visit(s), Petitioner
shall return the children to Respondent's home at 8:00 p.m. During other visits,
Petitioner shall return the children to Respondent's home at the time specified in
Section 30-3-35, Utah Code Annotated.
5.

Unless the parties agree otherwise in writing, beginning January 31, 2010 the

provisions of paragraph 4 of this order shall no longer apply, and the additional midweek visits
and Sunday church attendance shall automatically cease. Thereafter, Petitioner will have to elect
the pick-up time and day as set forth in Utah Code §30-3-35(2)(a), et seq.
6.

The parties shall participate in mediation. Petitioner's attorney shall attempt to

schedule mediation through the Utah Court of Appeals. If he is unable to obtain the Court of
Appeals' services for mediation, then mediation shall be conducted by Sandra Dredge, unless the
parties agree on the use of some other mediator.

